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A Generalization of the Classical Kelly Betting
Formula to the Case of Temporal Correlation
Joseph D. O’Brien, Kevin Burke, Mark E. Burke, and B. Ross Barmish
Abstract—For sequential betting games, Kelly’s theory, aimed at
maximization of the logarithmic growth of one’s account value,
involves optimization of the so-called betting fraction K. In this
Letter, we extend the classical formulation to allow for temporal
correlation among bets. To demonstrate the potential of this new
paradigm, for simplicity of exposition, we mainly address the
case of a coin-flipping game with even-money payoff. To this
end, we solve a problem with memory depth m. By this, we
mean that the outcomes of coin flips are no longer assumed
to be i.i.d. random variables. Instead, the probability of heads
on flip k depends on previous flips k − 1, k − 2, ..., k − m. For
the simplest case of n flips, with m = 1, we obtain a closed form
solution Kn for the optimal betting fraction. This generalizes
the classical result for the memoryless case. That is, instead
of fraction K∗ = 2p − 1 which pervades the literature for a
coin with probability of heads p ≥ 1/2, our new fraction Kn
depends on both n and the parameters associated with the
temporal correlation. Generalizations of these results for m > 1
and numerical simulations are also included. Finally, we indicate
how the theory extends to time-varying feedback and alternative
payoff distributions.
Index Terms—Stochastic systems, Markov processes, Finance,
Control applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN Kelly’s 1956 seminal paper [1], the notion of ExpectedLogarithmic Growth (ELG) was introduced as the perfor-
mance criterion for a memoryless repeated betting game. For
a sequence of i.i.d. gambles, for example a coin flip with
the probability of heads being p > 1/2, the theory leads to
an optimal betting fraction K∗, which, owing to its constant
nature from bet to bet is viewed as a time-invariant feedback
gain. That is, with Vk being the account value after k plays,
the optimal (k + 1)-th bet size is K∗Vk , where, for classical
coin flipping with even-money payoff, K∗ = 2p− 1.
The ELG approach has resulted in a voluminous body of
literature extending and applying the theory to other well-
known gambling games such as Blackjack and sports bet-
ting considered in [2] and [3], asset management and stock
trading as in [4]–[10]; see also the extensive bibliography
in the textbook [11]. Papers such as [12]–[17] have also
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covered related issues including asymptotics, problems related
to aggressiveness of wagers and alternative risk metrics.
The main feature which differentiates this paper from existing
work is our emphasis on the issue of temporal correlation
among games. While it is standard to assume correlation
among components of a multi-dimensional bet, for example, in
modern portfolio theory [5], temporal correlation is an entirely
different matter. Interestingly, although temporal effects are
studied in the context of prediction for financial time-series,
as in [18] and [19], this issue has received little attention in
the context of bet sizing in Kelly’s ELG framework; e.g., see
[20] where only one numerical example is considered.
Motivated by the fact that a bettor may gain an “edge”
by taking advantage of temporal correlation, we generalize
ELG theory to the case of a history-cognizant coin where
each outcome is no longer i.i.d. but dependent on the pre-
vious m results. Our analysis of this new framework lays
the groundwork for its use in financial applications with
temporally correlated returns, in particular by relating the
binary lattice model proposed in the sequel to stock price
movements (up or down) over a sequence of time points.
With this setting in mind, our primary analysis considers
two-outcome, even-money random variables Xk ∈ {−1, 1}
with a time-invariant feedback gain governing the bet size
which takes temporal autocorrelation into account. Although
we also provide further extensions to accommodate ℓ possible
outcomes given by Xk ∈ {x1, x2, ..., xℓ} and time-varying
feedback gains, our main focus is developing a new ELG
theory in the presence of memory with arbitrary depth,m ≥ 1.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: After
formalizing the notion of autocorrelated betting in Section II,
we consider the history-cognizant coin in Section III. Then,
our main result and extensions are provided in Section IV.
This includes, for n bets and memory depth m = 1, a closed-
form solution for the optimal betting fractionKn, generalizing
the classical K∗ = 2p − 1 result, and steady state analysis;
Section V is devoted to proof of this main theorem. Section VI
provides results for arbitrary memory depth m ≥ 1 and model
estimation, followed by numerical simulations and conclusions
in the remaining two sections.
II. AUTOCORRELATED KELLY BETTING
For the sake of self-containment, before introducing autocor-
relation, we review Kelly’s classical solution. Indeed, we start
by considering a discrete-time even-money coin-flipping game
with repeat i.i.d. bets and initial account value V0 > 0. Letting
Kz−1
unit delay
Vk
Xk
+
Vk+1
+
Fig. 1: Feedback control configuration
Vn denote the bettor’s account value after n plays, the classical
Kelly strategy is aimed at maximizing the expected value of
the logarithm of Vn rather than simply its expected value.
Letting Xk ∈ {−1, 1} be a random variable which represents
the pay-off from the kth coin toss where, Xk = 1 corresponds
to a head and Xk = −1 corresponds to a tail, the (k + 1)-th
bet is KVk with −1 ≤ K ≤ 1. The quantity |K| is referred
to as the betting fraction with K < 0 representing a bet on
tails rather than heads. Viewing Vk as a state, as noted for
example in [14], this defines a linear time-invariant feedback
control uk = KVk for the nonlinear system as depicted in
Figure 1, leading to the update
Vk+1 = Vk +Xkuk
= (1 +KXk)Vk.
We proceed to consider a game of n bets with outcomes given
by the sample path
X
.
= (X0, X1, X2, . . . , Xn−1) ∈ X
.
= {−1, 1}n.
This being the case, the corresponding account value at
terminal stage n, as a function of the pair (K,X), resulting
from this sample path is given by
Vn(K,X) = V0
n−1∏
k=0
[1 +KXk] ,
and an optimal betting fraction is obtained by maximizing the
Expected Logarithm Growth given by
ELG(K) =
1
n
E
{
log
[
Vn(K,X)
V0
]}
.
Since ELG(K) above is independent of V0, in the sequel,
without loss of generality, whenever convenient, it is assumed
that V0 = 1. In the standard i.i.d. setup, where p is the
probability of a head, the ELG is maximized at K∗ = 2p− 1.
We now proceed to generalize the standard approach by
assuming a probability distribution over X is available, and let
PX denote the probability of a sample path X. This is a joint
distribution over the components Xi of X, and, at this high
level of generality, this probability distribution is arbitrary.
In the analysis to follow, we first provide a result for this
general case which is abstract and then specialize to a scenario
frequently encountered in practice. That is, we consider the
case when the outcome of a given coin toss is correlated with
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Fig. 2: Sample paths with n = 2 and X−1 = x−1 ∈ {−1, 1}
the previous m outcomes. We henceforth refer to m as the
memory depth noting that a small value of m means that the
kth outcome is only related to the recent history. In this case, it
is straightforward to see that the probability PX of a sequence
X reduces to
PX =
n−1∏
k=0
Pr(Xk|Xk−1, Xk−2, . . . , Xk−m)
which is initialized by the m events X−m, X−m+1, . . . , X−1
prior the first outcome X0 at stage k = 0.
III. THE HISTORY-COGNIZANT COIN
Building on the above, we consider the simplest case of an
autocorrelated bet: a coin whose current flip is affected by the
previous flip. This is a coin with Markov memory, i.e., the
probability of a head on the kth flip is
Pr (Xk = 1 |Xk−1, Xk−2, . . . ) = Pr(Xk = 1 |Xk−1)
= ω0 + ω1Xk−1
with ω0 and ω1 assumed to be known; see Section VI for
considerations of how these parameters may be estimated. For
the parameterized linear function above, it is readily verified
that the conditions |ω1| < 0.5, |ω1| < ω0 < 1−|ω1| guarantee
that Pr(Xk = 1 |Xk−1) ∈ (0, 1). Now, via a straightforward
calculation, these requirements reduce to∣∣∣∣ω0 − 12
∣∣∣∣ + |ω1| < 12
which we recognize as describing the interior of an ℓ1 sphere,
the so-called “diamond” with center (1/2, 0) and radius (1/2).
In this setting, we have memory depth m = 1, and we assume
that we have observed one coin toss prior to betting, i.e.,
X−1 = x−1 ∈ {1,−1}. Figure 2 shows some illustrative
sample paths, consistent with the formulation presented above.
As mentioned in Section I, this binary lattice can serve as a
model for stock price movements over time categorized as
“up” (Xk = 1) or “down” (Xk = −1).
IV. MAIN RESULT
In this section, we provide our main result whose proof is
relegated to the next section. The first part of the theorem
below provides an abstract characterization of the optimal
betting fraction Kn in terms of the expected number of
heads E(Hn(X)) in the sample path X of length n, i.e., it
holds for arbitrary sample path distributions PX including and
beyond those considered here. It also points the way to the
second part of the theorem which addresses the case of a
history-cognizant coin and makes use of notation
p0
.
= ω0 + ω1x−1
corresponding to the unconditional probability that X0 = 1,
p∞
.
=
ω0 − ω1
1− 2ω1
which is later seen to be the steady state unconditional
probability of heads, and
λn
.
=
1
n
[
1− (2ω1)
n
1− 2ω1
]
which satisfies the condition
0 < λn < 1
since |2ω1| < 1 and tells us the relative weights of p0 and p∞
in the optimal solution.
Theorem: For n flips of the history-cognizant coin with
memory-depth m = 1 and conditional probability of heads
given by Pr(Xk = 1 |Xk−1) = ω0 + ω1Xk−1, the expected
logarithmic growth ELG(K) is maximized by
Kn = 2
{
E(Hn(X))
n
}
− 1,
where the expected value above is obtained as the convex
combination
E(Hn(X))
n
= λnp0 + (1− λn)p∞.
A. Special Cases, Generalizability and Remarks
The remainder of this section focusses on finer details of our
theory including its reduction to the classical Kelly formula for
the memoryless case, results regarding the limiting values of
the parameters used in the theorem, and generalizations of the
theory beyond the simple case of time-invariant even-money
two-outcome bets.
When Coin Flips are Independent: For the special case with
all payoffs Xk being i.i.d., we note that E(Hn) = np where
p = p0 = p∞ = ω0 is the probability of a head. In this case,
Kn = K
∗ = 2p − 1, which is the classical result obtained
in the absence of autocorrelation among bets as described in
Section II.
Long Run Steady State Considerations: Of general interest
are the limiting values of the quantities E(Hn) and Kn
described in the theorem as n→∞. The first point to note is
that λn(ω1)→ 0 which in turn implies that
lim
n→∞
E(Hn(X))
n
= p∞
and immediately leads to optimal betting fraction
K∞ = 2p∞ − 1.
The interpretation of this limit is quite simple: If we are
playing forever, the long-run probability of a head, p∞, leading
to K∞ is the same betting fraction as that which one would
obtain by ignoring correlation among the Xk and treating p∞
as if it is the unconditional probability of a heads in the
classical i.i.d. case. On the other hand, if we are betting for
a fixed time horizon n, the difference between E(Hn)/n and
p∞ is important. In particular, the optimal betting fraction Kn
depends on n and the startup probability p0 = ω0 + ω1x−1,
whereas K∞ does not. In practice, the importance of x−1
depends on the size of n, and magnitude of autocorrelation
coefficients ω0 and ω1.
Multiple Outcomes: As indicated in Section I, our theory
may be modified to address more general scenarios. For
example, consider the case where there are ℓ possible out-
comes x1, x2, ..., xℓ ∈ (−1,∞) for Xk. Let PX be an arbitrary
probability mass function over sample paths and let Hn,i(X)
be a random variable denoting the number of times, in a path
of length n, that Xk = xi for i = 1, 2, ..., ℓ. Then, using an
argument quite similar to the one used in the proof of the
theorem, we obtain
ELG(K) =
ℓ∑
i=1
E(Hn,i(X))
n
log(1 +Kxi),
which is straightforward to maximize numerically since it is
concave in K .
Time-Varying Feedback: A second generalization which may
also be considered, involves the use of time-varying feedback
gains rather than the time-invariant K synonymous with
previous literature. The most straightforward extension in this
direction is where, prior to the start of the game, the bettor
decides on a vector of betting fractions
K =
[
K˜0, K˜1, . . . , K˜n−1
]T
.
Note that the tilde notation distinguishes these time-varying
gains from the time-invariant Kn of our main theorem. Thus,
defining pk = Pr(Xk = 1) to be the unconditional probability
of a head on the kth coin toss,
ELG(K) =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
{
pk log
(
1 + K˜k
)
+ (1− pk) log
(
1− K˜k
)}
,
and this is maximized at
K˜k = 2pk − 1.
Interestingly, it is straightforward to show that
Kn =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
K˜k,
i.e., the time-invariant gain over n bets is the average of the
time-varying gains.
V. PROOF OF THE THEOREM
This section can be skipped by those readers solely interested
in the application aspects of this work. Indeed, to determine
the optimal betting fraction, we maximize the Expected Log-
arithm Growth. For simplicity of notation, we suppress the
dependence of Hn on the sample path X and calculate
ELG(K) =
1
n
E
{
n−1∑
k=0
log(1 +KXk)
}
=
1
n
∑
X∈X
PX
{
n−1∑
k=0
log(1 +KXk)
}
=
1
n
∑
X∈X
PX {Hn log(1 +K)
+(n−Hn) log(1−K)}
=
E(Hn)
n
log(1 +K)
+
{
1−
E(Hn)
n
}
log(1−K).
Now, noting that K = Kn = 2 {E(Hn)/n} − 1 is the
unique point of zero derivative and that ELG(K) is a concave
function, it follows that Kn is the unique maximizer.
It remains to derive an explicit formula for E(Hn)/n for the
case of the history-cognizant coin. First, since the expected
number of heads on the kth coin toss is pk = Pr(Xk = 1),
the expected number of heads in n coin tosses is
E(Hn) =
n−1∑
k=0
pk.
Now, to obtain a formula for the sum above, beginning with
conditional probability Pr(Xk = 1 |Xk−1) = ω0 + ω1Xk−1,
using the law of total expectation, we obtain a recursion
pk = E {Pr(Xk = 1|Xk−1)}
= ω0 + ω1E(Xk−1)
= 2ω1pk−1 + ω0 − ω1,
where the last line follows since E(Xk−1) = 2pk−1 − 1.
Initializing with p0 = ω0 + ω1x−1, the solution to this linear
equation is, since |2ω1| < 1,
pk = (2ω1)
kp0 +
[
1− (2ω1)
k
]
p∞
where p∞ = (ω0 − ω1)/(1− 2ω1). Thus,
E(Hn)
n
=
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
(2ω1)
kp0 +
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
[
1− (2ω1)
k
]
p∞
= λnp0 + (1− λn)p∞. 
VI. DEEPER MEMORY
We consider the general case of memory depth m > 1 and
show how analytic expressions for E(Hn) can be efficiently
obtained. Indeed, beginning with parameterization of the con-
ditional probability of heads
Pr(Xk = 1|Xk−1, Xk−2, ..., Xk−m) = ω0 +
m∑
i=1
ωiXk−i
with assumed initial conditions
X−i = x−i for i = 1, 2, ...m.
To ensure that Pr(Xk = 1|Xk−1, Xk−2, ..., Xk−m) ∈ (0, 1)
we assume the ω parameters to lie in the “hyperdiamond”∣∣∣∣ω0 − 12
∣∣∣∣+
m∑
i=1
|ωi| <
1
2
.
Then, the unconditional probability pk that Xk = 1 is
pk = E{Pr(Xk = 1|Xk−1, Xk−2, . . . , Xk−m)},
= ω0 +
m∑
i=1
ωiE(Xk−i)
for k = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1. Substituting E(Xk−i) = 2pk−i − 1,
above and taking note of the “induced” initial conditions
p−i =
(x−i + 1)
2
for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
we arrive at the recursion
pk = ω0 −
m∑
i=1
ωi + 2
m∑
i=1
ωipk−i
which holds for k = 0, 1, ..., n − 1, and from which E(Hn)
and hence Kn may be calculated. To illustrate a specific case,
for memory depth m = 3 and n = 2 flips, we find that
E(H2) = x−1(2ω
2
1 + ω1 + ω2) + x−2(2ω1ω2 + ω2 + ω3)
+ x−3(2ω1ω3 + ω3) + 2ω0ω1 + 2ω0 − ω1.
State-Space Formulation: As an alternative to the above,
which may perhaps prove useful in future research, we con-
sider a standard state-space realization of the “delay sys-
tem” to represent the scalar recursion for pk. That is, by
introducing the m-dimensional state vector which is given
by vk = [pk−m+1, pk−m+2, . . . , pk]
T , we readily obtain a
classical companion form realization vk+1 = Avk + buk
with triple (A, b, c), input u(k) ≡ 1 and output being pk. To
illustrate, for memory depth m = 3, we obtain
A =

 0 1 00 0 1
2ω3 2ω2 2ω1

 ; b =

 00
ω0 − ω1 − ω2 − ω3

 ;
and c = [0 0 1] with solution of the recursion given by
pk = c
(
Akv0 +
k−1∑
i=0
Ak−1−ib
)
= c
(
Akv0 + (I −A)
−1(I −Ak)b
)
and the matrix I − A is guaranteed to be invertible since
det(I−A) = 1−2
∑m
i=1 ωi must be non-zero due to the hyper-
diamond constraint on the ωi. In addition, from Gerschgorin’s
circle theorem [21] and the hyperdiamond constraint, each
eigenvalue of A has magnitude less than 1, and so Ak → 0
as k → ∞. Using this fact, beginning with pk above, this
leads to the generalization of our steady-state unconditional
probability
p∞ = c(I −A)
−1b.
Now recognizing that this corresponds to the transfer function
H(z) for the triple (A, b, c) evaluated at z = 1, we immedi-
ately arrive at
p∞ =
ω0 − (ω1 + · · ·+ ωm)
1− 2(ω1 + · · ·+ ωm)
.
Estimation: In practice, prior to betting, it is necessary to ob-
tain values for the ωi parameters. First, define the “response”
variable Yk = (Xk + 1)/2 such that
E(Yk |Xk−1, Xk−2, . . . , Xk−m) = ω0 +
m∑
i=1
ω1Xk−i.
Then, having observed data x−ℓ, . . . , x−1, we compute the
(ℓ−m)× 1 response vector
y
.
=
1
2
{
[x−ℓ+m, x−ℓ+m+1, . . . , x−1]
T + 1
}
,
and minimize the residual sum of squares
RSS(ω) =
−1∑
k=−ℓ+m
(
yk − ω0 −
m∑
i=1
ωixk−i
)2
,
with respect to ω = [ω0, ω1, . . . , ωm]
T . Whereas classical
estimation theory leads to the least squares solution
ωˆ = argmin
ω
RSS(ω) = (XTX)−1XTy
with X being the (ℓ −m) × (m + 1) matrix whose ith row
is given by [1, xi−ℓ+m−2, xi−ℓ+m−3, . . . , xi−ℓ−1], enforce-
ment of the hyperdiamond constraints leads to a positive-
definite convex program to be solved.
VII. NUMERICAL SIMULATION
We present results for simulations with returns driven by a
process with Pr(Xk = 1 |Xk−1) = ω0 + ω1Xk−1, comparing
ELG performance for the classical Kelly K∗-bettor, the Kn-
bettor, and the K-bettor. Accordingly, from Section IV, the
classical K∗-bettor, disregarding temporal correlation, works
with the probability of heads being p∞ and uses the time-
invariant betting fraction K∗ = 2p∞ − 1. On the other
hand, assuming ω0 and ω1 are perfectly estimated, the Kn-
bettor exploits temporal correlation and uses fraction Kn =
2{λnp0 + (1 − λn)p∞} − 1, while the K-bettor, who is also
aware of the correlation, uses separate K values for each stage
via K˜k = 2pk − 1.
To provide a flavor of our findings, we first consider the
following scenario: We initialize the game by supposing that
the prior event was X−1 = 1, and take ω0 = 0.55, ω1 = 0.20.
In this specific situation, a straightforward calculation using
our theory directly leads to values of p0 = 0.75, p∞ = 0.583,
and λn ≈ 0.556(1 − 0.4
n)/n; hence, K∗ ≈ 0.167 and
Kn ≈ 0.556(1−0.4
n)/n+0.167 from which it is immediately
clear that Kn > K
∗ (but tends to K∗ in the long run per
Section IV). In this setting, due to the positive correlation
(ω1 > 0), and fact that X−1 = 1, earlier coin tosses are more
likely to be heads than later ones. Therefore, when betting
for a fixed time horizon n, the Kn-bettor takes advantage
of the temporal correlation by placing larger bets than those
suggested by the correlation-ignoring K∗ value. However,
although accounting for autocorrelation, Kn is time-invariant.
For n = 2, Kn = 0.4, whereas K = (0.5, 0.3) (and recall
from Section IV that Kn is the average of the elements of
K). Thus, the K-bettor, recognizing that X0 is most likely
to be a head, bets more heavily on the first bet than on the
second. Of course, both the Kn- and K-bettors bet more
heavily than the K∗-bettor, and, indeed, for the n = 2 case,
we find that ELG(K∗) ≈ 0.053, ELG(Kn) ≈ 0.082, and
ELG(K) ≈ 0.088.
Beyond n = 2, Figure 3(a) shows ELG values for a range
of n over which the K-bettor outperforms the Kn-bettor who
in turn outperforms the K∗-bettor. This scenario is analogous
to one which arises for a financial asset on an upward trend
(since pk ≥ p∞ ≈ 0.5833). In such a setting, the majority of
strategies will do well, e.g., all three here have positive ELG,
but, importantly, incorporating temporal correlation boosts
performance. Figure 3(b) displays the results for a similar
simulation but with ω1 = −0.2. As with the first scenario,
this represents long-run upward trend since p∞ ≈ 0.5357, but
the negative autocorrelation means that the process fluctuates
more; in particular, X0 is most likely to be a tail since X−1
was a head. In this setting, neither the K∗- nor the Kn-bettors
do very well, albeit the latter at least has non-negative ELG,
whereas the K-bettor has significantly improved performance.
To see why this is, consider the n = 2 case whereK∗ ≈ 0.071,
Kn = −0.04, and K = (−0.3, 0.22). Thus, the K-bettor
makes use of the fluctuation by betting on tails first and
on heads second but bets less heavily in the second due to
the increased uncertainty; the Kn-bettor averages over these
fluctuations, slightly favouring tails but ultimately betting very
little, whereas the K∗-bettor wrongly favours heads.
Lastly, in Figure 3(c) we briefly consider another interesting
scenario shown which corresponds to X−1 = 1, ω0 = 0.35
and ω1 = 0.33. The important feature in this case is that it
corresponds to a long-run downward trend (with p∞ = 0.058)
but where the positive temporal correlation and the fact that
X−1 = 1 mean that X0 = 1 is most likely. In this case,
the K∗-bettor suboptimally takes a heavy short position (i.e.,
bets on tails) with K∗ ≈ −0.883 leading to large negative
ELG value early on (only becoming positive for n > 10). In
contrast, both Kn- and K-bettors achieve positive growth over
all n. Note that, for all three scenarios, and over all n values,
ELG(K∗) ≤ ELG(Kn) ≤ ELG(K) which is consistent with
our exploitation of temporal correlation to obtain improved
Kelly-type betting strategies which have not been considered
in the existing literature.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we formulated a class of Kelly optimal ELG
problems which account for temporal correlation over the
sequence of gambles. In the main theorem, for memory
depthm = 1 and n flips, a closed form solution for the optimal
betting fraction Kn was obtained. The paper also includes
analysis for the case when n → ∞ and solutions for deeper
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Fig. 3: Simulation demonstrating the ELG of account value for the three bettors with X−1 = 1, and different combinations
of ω0 and ω1.
memory m > 1 which can be obtained by either propagation
of the recursive formula for pk or use of the state space
realization for the associated delay system. While our primary
focus has been the development of ELG theory in the pres-
ence of autocorrelation, we have also provided extensions to
multiple-payoffs and time-varying feedback gains. Numerical
simulations which included comparison with classical Kelly
betting results on games with temporal correlation were also
shown in order to demonstrate the potential advantages offered
by our framework.
In future work, we envision our theory to be especially appli-
cable to scenarios in which an investor wishes to incorporate
temporal correlations into algorithmic trading strategies over
the course of time. In particular, the conceptual framework
introduced within this Letter has potential to provide the base
upon which multiple extensions beyond those proposed above
can be built; one such avenue is the so-called portfolio case
with correlation both temporally and across components. In
this case it is felt that concave programming will play an
important role in computation; e.g., see [22]. Finally, a further
direction of research involves a study of ELG performance as
a function of betting frequency in the context of the temporal
correlation framework introduced here; e.g., see [23] for initial
work along these lines and [24] for analysis of the memoryless
case.
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